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ABSTRACT
Thelabor force participation rate of older men under age 65 has shown
a significant recent decline. Cross—sectional studies linking early re-
tirement to increased Social Security income have also made explicit or
implicit temporal projections of changes in participation in response to
changes in benefits. However, use of cross—sectional estimates for projec-
tion purposes may run into several problems, including temporal dependence
of the participation decision. This paper uses 2—year longitudinal data
for men aged 58—62 in 1969 in order to trace changes in labor force beha-
vior near retirement age. Results indicate significant effects of poor
health, initial assets, and initial pension eligibility on the probabili-
ties of exit and entry from the labor force. Social Security benefits are
found to have insignificant or unexpected effects. The results also indi-
cate evidence of temporal dependence of participation, suggesting caution







There has been a significant recent decrease in the labor force par—
ticipation rates of older mciiunderage 65.In the55—64age group the
participation ratewas 75.8per cent in 1975 as opposed to 86.8 per cent in
1960. On the other hand, there hasbeen rapid concurrent growth in two
major sources of early retirement income ——SocialSecurity and non—Social
Security pensions. The two major sources of Social Security growth have
been Disability Insurance (DI) benefit payments, which increased in real
terms from $.8 billion in 1960 to $6.7 billion in 1975, and Old Age (OA)
benefits, which increased in real terms from $11.4 billion to $34.1 billion
over the same period. In addition non—Social Security pension benefits
increased in real terms from $6.3 billion to $25.9 billion.
Most previous survey research dealing with self—reported causes for
retirement had found poor health to be dominant.' For example, Schwab
(1974) found that 65 per cent of men aged 58—63 who left the labor
force in 1969 mentioned health as the reason for withdrawal. However,
recent research regarding actual work decisions have found economic
variables such as Social Security or other pension benefits to be important
determinants of retirement among the elderly.
Most studies of the effect of Social Security and pensions on labor
forceparticipation have focused on the effect of the Old—Age system and
pensions on retirement,2 while other studies have examined the effect
'For an exhaustive list of references, see Boskin (1977). Self—
reported responses may be misleading since it may be socially acceptable to
state poor health as a reason for retirement.
2See Bowen and Finegan (1969), Feldstein (1974), Boskin (1977),Quinn
(1977), Pellechio (1978)—2—
oI Disability Insurance on labor force participation.3 These studies have
primarily utilized cross—section data, and almost all, have found Social
Security and pensions to have significant negative effects on par-
ticipation. Many of these studies have then used these estimates to pre-
dict the effect of (temporal) changes in Social Security benefits and tax
rates on the participation probability.4'5
However, use of cross—section estimates to predict time—oriented beha-
vior may have several drawbacks. First, the variables in a cross section
represent equilibrium values, and therefore lags in the individual par-
ticipation decision are not allowed for as would be the case with longitu-
dinal or panel data. -
Secondly,cross—section estimates do not capture the effect of struc-
tural changes over time in Social Security and other pension programs on
individual behavior.
Thirdly, in looking at an individual's sequential participation deci-
sion, there maybedependence among the decisions at different points in
time. That is, an individual maybemore likely to work (not work) in
period t 11 they worked (didn't work) in period t—l. ThIs problem of
temporal dependence is discussed in more detail in the next section.
If temporal dependence is present, cross—section data maybeinadequate
3See Berkowitz, et al (1976), Parsons (1980a,b). Most of these studies
use samples of middle aged men or men aged 18—64.
4Parsoris (1980a) used cross—section estimates to predict trends in non-
participation from 1948—1966 for males aged 48—62. Other predictions have
been implicitly temporal, since changes in Social Security parameters are
legislated over time.
5The primary tax rate examined has been the so—called "earnings test,
whereby there Is an implicit tax consisting of a 50—cent reduction in
retirement benefits for every dollar earned above an exempt amount.—.3—
in ptedicting the sequential participation probability of an individual, as
well asthe participation rate of a given age group of individuals.
In order toattempt to address and examine these problems, this paper
usesa longitudinal sample of older men extracted from the Longitudinal
Retirement Study (LRHS). Although these men are traced over only a two-
year period, the effect of changes in Social Security benefits, pension
coverage, and other variables on labor force entry and exit at or near
retirement age can be examined.
Section II examines more closely the issue of temporal dependence,
while Section III presents the empirical Implementation and results.
II. Temporal Dependence of Labor Force Participation
The problem of temporal dependence of the labor force participation
decision has been discussed by authors such as Heckman and Willis (1977),
Ben—Porath (1973), Long and Jones (1980), and Taubman and Rosen (1982).
An example of temporal dependence is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1




Thetwo parallel lines show the relationship between labor force par—
ticipation(LFP)andtime (t), for two values of the independent variable
(X1 and X2). A cross—section estimate of X would measure the distance D
between the two lines for some point in time (tj). A regression using
longitudinal data would be measuring the effect of a change in X on the
change in participation over time, dLFP. In Figure 1, we would then
dt
be comparing the slopes of the two lines for different values of X.
Since the lines are parallel, dLFP would be the same for both X because
dt
of temporal dependence in the participation decisicin. Therefore, the
cross—section estimate could not be used to predict individual labor force
participation over time.
Several sources of temporal dependence have been noted in the litera-
ture, two of which are discussed here.6 The first source is known as
"true"dependence(Heckman and Willis (1976), Ben—Porath (1973)). This
occurs if there are transactions costs of working. This would include
fixed costs of working, employee search costs, costs of not working, or
employer hiring costs. For example, if there are fixed costs of working
and the individual is out of the labor force, the condition that the wage
exceed the shadow price of time may not be sufficient to induce participation,
6One source of dependence not discussed here is known as "apparent"
state dependence (Heckman and Willis, 1977). This is caused by permanent
unobserved differences among observationally identical individuals which
may persist over time. Heckman and Willis show that cross—section estima-
tes may be used to predict the sequential participation behavior of an
average Individualwithina group; however, this estimate will differ from
theaverage behavior of the group itself.—5—
since a gap is induced between the shadow price of time and the reservation
wage.7 An example of costs of not working is found withtheDisability
Insurance (DI) program. The DI program requires an applicant for benefits
to have been disabled for at least five months (six months prior to 1972)
before they can receive benefits. This time cost of this "waitingperiod"
(in addition to any delays in the processing of the application) will be
valued at the individualts pre—application earnings. As a result,an
increase in DI benefits for a worker may cause the shadow price of time to
rise above the market wage; however, application costsmay prevent the
individual from dropping out of the labor force an4 applying for
benefits.8 -
Asecond major source of temporal dependence are variables whichare
-time—varying.Examples of this are changes inresidence, changes in
health,or changes in non—labor income (such as Social Security benefits).
Forexample, we might expect an initial deterioration in health to strongly
affect the sequential participation probability of an individual, but would
expectthe effect of any subsequent worsening to "die off" over time.
Asa result of these two sources of temporal dependence, wemay be
unableto predict individual sequential participation behavior using
7The concept of fixed costs ofworking is discussed by Cogan (1981) and
Hausman (1980).
8Although there is no direct evidence linking the decisionto apply for
DI benefits and the decision not to work, thepresence of the aforeinen—
tioned "waiting period," as well as the decision to apply asa result of a
past or present disability, point to equivalence of the two decisions.
This equivalence is assumed by authors such as Parsons (1980a,b)(,
C dosS—sect tonal eat[maten. Therelore,I ong I tiid an 1 darn I S fl(tdCd to
t race cha ages Inlabor force part [ci patton a ad t [me—vary I ng I ridepcide at
va rtables.
LIII. Dataand Empirical tmplementatiori
We will attempt here to examine the effect of Social Security and other
variables on changes in labor force participation over time, as well as to
test for the presence of temporal dependence in the participation decision.
The empirical framework Involves the estimation of separate equations
measuring the probability of exit from and entry Into the labor force.
The micro data used for estimation are taken from the 1969 original
sample and the 1971 reinterview sample of the Longitudinal Retirement
History Study (LRHS). The final sample extracted consisted of 2991 males
aged 58—62 in 1969 who were insured by the Social Security system based on
their past earnings and employment.9''0
The labor force behavior of these men was determined for 1968 and 1970,
the year previous to each Interview. This was to minimize the effect of
transitory factors on labor force behavior. The labor force activity for
these men between 1968 and 1970 was given by the following totals (where
NLF=notin labor force):
91n order to be insured for both DI and retirement (OASI) benefits, the
Individual must have had at least 20 quarters of coverage during the
40—quarter period ending with the quarter in which a disability mayhave
begun (Disability Insured status). This is In addition to having the suf-
ficient quarters of coverage for OASI benefits.
10Theoriginal 1969 LRHS sample was aged 58—63. However, we eliminated
those aged 63 in 1969 (age 65 in 1971) in order to distinguish between
disability benefits and early retirement benefits. At age 65, disability
benefits become regular retirement benefits under Social Security.— I—
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Usingthe above classifications, the dependent variable representing
entry into the labor force is defined as:
)0if NLF in 1968 and NLF in 1970
ENTRY. =
1if NLF in 1968 and WORKING in 1970
The variable representing exit from the labor force is defined as:
)0if WORKING in 1968 and WORKING in 1970
EXIT=
( 1if WORKING in 1968 and NLF in 1970
Table 1 defines the independent variables to be used in the EXIT and
ENTRY equations. Because of the timing of the LRHS survey, certain
variables such as marital status, assets, and age were based on current
responses given at the time of the surveys in 1969 and 1971. We will
assume here that these variables also pertain to the previous year (1968
and 1970).
Variables measuring the individual's assets (ASSETS and ASSETS)
include the value of stocks, bonds, savings accounts, and life insurance,
as well as the net value of property or business. Increases in asset
income would be expected to increase the exit probability through the
income effect, if liesure is a normal good. In addition, if the individual
chooses to exit the labor force in order to apply for DI benefits, an
increase in assets would better enable the individual to "finance" the
application Costs involved (waiting period, delays in processing)— 8—
Table 1
Definitionsof Independent Variables Used in EXIT and ENTRY Equations
ED =yearsof schooling completed
AGE =age,in 1969 interview
ASSETS=dollarvalue of assets in 1969 (in thousands)
4ASSETS =dollarvalue of assets in 1971 minus dollar value of assets
in 1969 (in thousands)
WAGE =hourlywage rate in 1968
WACE =hourlywage rate in 1970 minus hourly wage rate in 1968
DIBE =potentialmonthly benefits from Social Security Disability
Insurance (DI) in 1968 -
DIBEN=potentialDI monthlybenefits in 1970 minus potential DI
monthly benefits in 1968
REDBEN=potentialmonthly reduced retirement (OA) benefits in 1968
.AREDBEN =potentialreduced OA monthly benefits in 1970 minus potential
reduced OA monthly benefits in 1968
ELIG =dummyvariable equal to 1 ifcurrentlyeligible for benefits
froma pension plan (other than Social Security or Railroad
Retirement) in 1969, 0 otherwise
RACE =dummyvariable equal to i if black, 0 otherwise
LIMIT =dummyvariable equal to 1 if had a health condition or
disability which limited getting around in 1969, 0 otherwise
GOTLIM =dummyvariable equal to 1 if developed a health condition or
disability between the two interview dates, 0 otherwise
MOVE =dummyvariable equal to 1 if changed address between interview
dates, 0 otherwise
MARIT =dummyvariable equal to 1 if married as of 1969 interview,
0 otherwise—9—
The variables WAGE and WAGE measure the individuaL's initial hourly
wage rateand change from 1968 to 1970. There may he sample selectivity
bias if usual missing data procedures are used for assigning wages to non—
participants (such as the sample mean). This is because the relationship
between selection into the working sample (participation) and the availabi-
lity of wage data Is ignored (see Hausman (1980), Heckman (1976)). In
order to correct for possible selectivity bias, wages were imputed for non—
workers in 1968 and 1970. The imputed wages were based on the following
log—wage regression estimated on the 1968 working subsample:
LNWAGE —.391 + .055 ED + .013 AGE —.,010RACE
(—.6) (11.4) (1.0) (—.16)
—.052 LIMIT + .082 MARIT —.654LAMDAR2 =.04 (1)
(—.64) (1.5) (—.9)
where LANDA is the selectivity correction factor (inverse of Mill's
ratio)."
The variables DIBEN and DIBEN measure the individual's potential
monthly benefits under Social Security Disability Insurance. Calculations
were based on the 1968 and 1970 benefit formulas, using past covered ear—
flings from the individual's Social Security employment record (this record
had been merged with their LRHS data). The calculated benefits were then
deflated using implicit price deflators for consumer expenditures. Note
that since potential (as opposed to actual) benefits are used, there is no
simultaneity problem In the sense of benefits depending upon labor force
participation.
''The imputed wages for nonworkers were based on theparticular values
of the Independent variables in equation (1) for the year in question.
Unfortunately, comparable information on place of residence was not
available in the 1969 and 1971 surveys; this omission may partly explain
the low R—squared value of the wage equation.I — It)
Thevariables REDBEN and REDBEN measure potenttai Social Security
reduced retirement beneFits for 1968 and 1970, aga in calculated I ruin the
individual'sSocialSecurity record. These benefits were also deflated.
For individualsaged 62—64, reduced retirement benefits represent an alter-
native early retirement source to Disability Insurance.'2
Thevariable MOVE is a dummy indicating a change in address during the
2—year interval. This variable may in part reflect changing labor market
conditions. However, for this sample of older men, MOVE may largely
reflect movement to a warmer climate suitable for retirement years.
Distinguishing between the two possibilities is an 'empirical question.
The variable ELIG is a dummy Indicating current eligibility in 1969 for
benefits from a non Social Security (private and public) pension plan. The
eligible individual is entitled to a stream of pension benefits from date
of retirement until his death. We would therefore expect the individual to
retire in order to maximize his expected benefit stream (see Taubman (1981)).13
The variables LIMIT and GOTLIM are dummy variables indicating presence
of a self—reported health limitation in 1969 and development of a limitation
'2At age 65, Disability Insurance benefits revert to old—age retirement
benefits under Social Security. Even though DI benefits exceed reduced
retirement benefits at a given age (since there is no reduction for DI),
persons may still choose to apply for reduced retirement benefits for such
reasons as "stigma" attached to receiving DI.
'3There is evidence that ELIG may be endogenous. Taubman (1981) found
expected receipt of a pension to be significantly related to education,
marital status, occupation, industry, and assets. However, because ELIG
does refer to job related pensions (and because of statistical complica-
tions resulting from self—selection into pension plans) we treat ELIG as
exogenous.
The analysis also suggests including a dummy variable for having become
eligible for a pension between 1968 and 1970. However, this variable was
not Included since length of service requirements for pension eligibility
would make this virtually identical to having worked in both 1968 and 1970.between 1969 and 19/I.Lii;iddl.LioiiLuit lienii)iH iiics betweenIlestire
and consumption goods, the development of a disah[ L[ty will of course
increase the probabilityof being accepted for DI benefits. This would
thenincrease the p robahl. ii. ty of (1 ropping out of the labor force I. rt order
to apply for benefits.
RACEis a dummy variable denoting the individual's race, and allows us
to test for black—white differences in labor force attachment among older
men. MARIT is a dummy variable representing marital status.
ED and AGE indicate the individual's years of schooling completed and
age in 1969, respectively. These variables might he expected to affect
entry and exit by altering the individual's preference between liesure and
consumption goods over the life cycle, through their effect on personal
tasçes or home productivity (see Becker (1965), Hanoch (1976), Grossman
(1972)). For example, if schooling has the effect over time of raising the
cost of time producing household commodities (relative to the cost of
market good inputs), we would expect schooling to be negatively related to
the probability of exit from the labor force.
In addition to more closely examining changes in participation,
separate estimation of entry and exit equations allow us to test for the
extent of temporal dependence in individual participation decisions.
If there is no temporal dependence, then relationships normally found
in cross section relationships can be applied to longitudinal rela-
tionships. For example, if an increase in assets decreases the probability
of working in a cross—section, then an increase in assets between 1968 and
1970 would increase the probability of exiting the labor force over this
interval. Symmetrically, a decrease in assets between 1968 and 1970 would
increase the probability of entering the labor force. If the relationships— 12—
ae not$ymlnetricaland/or [nsignt U [cant, thereIs tiidLcat [on of tenport
dependence.
Additional evidenceof temporal dependence is revealed by the effect of
"initial variables" (e.g. WAGE, DIBEN, ASSETS) on the probability of entry
andexit from the labor force. Initial variableswill affect cumulative
labor force participation over time. However, only ifthere is temporal
dependence would we also expect these variables to affect changes in the
participation probability (probability of entry and exit). For example, an
initial increase in the wage rate may reduce the exit probability, possibly
because of fixed costs of reentering the labor force if the individual
stops working. Therefore, significance of these initial variables in the
EXIT or ENTRY equations would imply temporal dependence.
Table 2 shows preliminary maximum likelihood probit estimates of the
ENTRY and EXIT equations. Column (1) of each equation used the full sample
of 2991 men. Column (2) used a subsample of 2273 men in order to construct
the variable COTLIM, which Included men who either had no self—reported
health limitation in the two interview dates, or developed a limitation
between the two dates. Although columns (1) and (2) of the ENTRY and EXIT
equations differed somewhat in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates,
the significance levels of the standard errors were largely unchanged.
The Individuals' initial level of assets (ASSETS) had a significant
positive effect on the exit probability and a significant negative effect
on the entry probability. However, changes in asset income (iASSETS) had
significant effects in both equations.
The race dummy variable (RACE) had negative coefficients in both the
ENTRY and EXIT equations, though the coefficient was significant in the
EXIT equation only. This suggests a greater labor force attachment for— —
Table2
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olderblack men; lioweve r, the nega tiveof Ccci ol RACEintheENTRY equaC[on
suggests caution in interpreting the results.
The presence of a self—reported limiting health condition in the ini-
tial year (LIMIT) had significant coefficients in both equations, mdi-
cating a positive effect of initial poor health ontheprobability of labor
forceexit, and a negative effect on the probability of entry. Development
of a limiting health condition (COTLIM) had the expected signs, although
its coefficient was significant only in the ENTRY equation. Change in
address (MOVE) had a positive and significant effect in the EXIT equation,
but an insignificant effect in the ENTRY equation. The results suggest
that this variable is measuring movement to a warmer climate for retirement
purposes, as opposed to a labor market response.
Present eligibility for non—Social Security pension benefits in 1969
(ELIG) was highly significant in both ENTRY and EXIT equations. Pension
eligibility was positively related to the exit probability and negatively
related to the entry probability. Though expected, this result also indi-
cates a somewhat delayed retirement response to current pension eligibi—
II ty.
Looking at the Social Security variable, potential reduced retirement
benefits (REDBEN and LREDBEN) were insignificant in both the ENTRY and EXIT
equations. Initial potential Disability Insurance benefits (DIBEN) also
had insignificant effects. Change in DI benefits (DIBEN) had significant
coefficients in both equations, but the signs were opposite to the expected
ones (negative for EXIT and positive for ENTRY). One possible explanation
for this is that DI benefits are a positive function of past coveredwages.
Therefore, DIBEN may have been picking up a permanent wage effect as
opposed to the intended income effect, whereas WAGE and M1AGE may have
actually been measures of transitory wages.— 1')—
Theother variables in Table 2 were Lnstgn[fhant:. Schooling (ED) was
positive and significant in column (I) of the EXITequationhut Insignifi-
cant elsewhere.
The empirical results also indicated a highdegreeof temporal depen-
dencein the labor force participation decision. Partial evidence of this
was the significance of "initial" variables (ASSETS, LIMIT, ELIG) in the
exit and entry equations. Additional evidence was found in the insignifi-
cance of "change" variables (tASSETS, WAGE, 1REDBEN) which would have been
expected (in the absence of temporal dependence) to have significant
effects based on previous cross—section results. This implies the need for
caution in interpreting projections of temporal changes in participation
based on cross—section estimates, although the disappointing results here
for the Social Security variables do not allow us to make meaningful alter-
native projections.
Conclusion
This paper has examined determinants of the declining labor force par-
ticipation rates of older men under age 65. Previous attempts to use
cross—sectional estimates to predict temporal effects of changes in Social
Security and other variables on retirement may have several potential
problems including temporal dependence of labor force participation there-
fore suggesting use of longitudinal data.
The empirical implementation involved separate estimation of equations
measuring the probability of exit from and entry into the labor force over
a 2—year period. The sample used consisted of men aged 58—62 in 1969
extracted from the 1.969 and 1971 waves of the Longitudinal Retirement
History Study (LRRS). Among noneconomic variables, maximum likelihood pro—
bit estimates indicated significant effects of poor health (both initial
and acquired) on the probabilities of entry and exit. Anong the economic— 16 —
variables,initial eligibility for non—Social Security pension bcneftts and
initial asset income had stgnl.ficant negative (posittve) effectsonthe entry
(exit) probabilities. Social Security (retirement and Dl) benefits had
either insignificant or unexpected effects. Overall, the results indicated
temporal dependence in the participation decision, suggesting caution in
interpreting projections of cross—section estimates.
The result obtained here pertain to a fairly short time horizon.
Examination of retirement over a longer period would, first, allow the
effects of short—term changes in Social Security benefits (as well as
"initial" changes) to be examined in a life—cycle retirement framework, and
secondly, would more fully allow for response lags in the retirement deci-
sion. Analysis of further LRHS reinterview waves from 1973 through 1979
will be of use in this matter.— 17—
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